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JOINT OPERATING AGREEMENT - CASE LAW UPDATE AND OTHER MATTERS
OF INTEREST
By

Michel E. Curry
Cotton, Bledsoe, Tighe & Dawson, P.C.
Midland, Texas

I.

INTRODUCTION

The joint operating agreement1 (“JOA”) is one of the most commonly used documents in
oil and gas exploration. As a basic tenet, the JO A is an agreement among the various owners of
the oil and gas leasehold estate intended to govern the orderly development and operation of the
jointly held property. During the negotiation phase of the agreement, the objectives of the
parties, if not their interests, are more or less perfectly aligned. Each party sees clearly ahead the
prospect of a union in which substantial mutual benefits are to be derived. As a result, more
often than not agreement upon even the most contentious points occurs with little difficulty.
However, at some point after operations commence, the perfectly aligned interests of the parties
may begin to diverge and the relationship then becomes adversarial. Often, some or all of the
disputing parties are successors to the original signatories. For the most part, the nature of those
disputes fall into predictable and repeating areas of disagreement. This paper will explore the
development of recent case law2 in the context of those areas commonly resulting in legal action
among the participants.
II.

NOTICE

One of the recurring themes resulting in litigation among parties to a JOA relates to
giving and receiving notices.3* In its most fundamental essence, notice acts as a “trigger”. Some
type of notice must be provided in connection with any proposed operation other than the Initial
Well provided for in Article VI.A. With respect to the Initial Well, the lion’s share of
communication occurs during the negotiation phase and no other notice is required. At the
original execution point, a well has been proposed, a cost estimate furnished, and all of the
parties have agreed to participate. However, as to subsequent operations, the elements of the
notice content, the parties providing and receiving notice, and the timing of the notice are
frequent subjects of dispute among JOA participants.

1 For purposes o f this paper, all references to particular operating agreement provisions shall be to the American
Association o f Professional Landmen Form 610— 1989 Model Form Operating Agreement, unless clearly indicated
otherwise.
2 Although this paper is presented to the Arkansas Bar 45th Annual Natural Resources Law Institute, the author
practices and is licensed in Texas and New Mexico. Therefore, the case law discussion will emphasize Texas cases
with the hope that the discussion o f these matters will be useful in JOA analyses regardless o f jurisdiction.
3 We purposely omit any discussion o f notice in the context o f the JOA preferential right to purchase provision as
that is a topic unto itself and well beyond the limitations o f this particular paper.
1
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A. ESTIMATED EXPENSES
For the most part, the JOA is a financial instrument. The operating agreement is
filled with provisions allocating financial responsibility. Article VI.B.l requires notice of
estimated costs to be included in connection with proposals for subsequent operations.4 This is
typically accomplished by the operator (or proposing party) furnishing an authority for
expenditure, or “AFE” to the non-operators. AFE’s are planning tools intended to communicate
some detail as to the intended operation and to give the parties notice of the anticipated expenses.
This area is one of the many points where “lore” and “law” part ways. Contrary to popular lore,
AFE’s do not limit expenditures - they are only an estimate of the anticipated costs associated
with a proposed operation.5 Three provisions in particular point to the responsibility for well
costs:
Art.III.B. “Unless changed by other provisions, all costs and liabilities incurred in
operations under this agreement shall be borne and paid ... by the parties as their interests
are set forth in Exhibit “A”.
Art. VI. A. “The drilling of the Initial Well and the participation therein by all parties is
obligatory, subject to Article VI.C.l. as to participation in completion operations [casing
point election] and Article VI.F. as to termination of operations and Article XI as to
occurrence of force majeure.”
Art. V I.C .l. “Consent to the drilling, Deepening or Sidetracking shall include:
Option No. 1: All necessary expenditures for the drilling, Deepening or
Sidetracking, testing, Completing and equipping of the well, including necessary
tankage and/or surface facilities.
Option No. 2 : All necessary expenditures for the drilling, Deepening,
Sidetracking and testing of the well.” [here follows casing point election
language relating to completing and equipping the well].
(emphasis added).
Clearly, all three of these key provisions relate that, once committed, each party electing to
participate in an operation is obligated to pay its proportionate share of all expenses incurred in
the operation.

4 No cost estimate for drilling the Initial Well is required. Generally, a cost estimate o f that well is furnished
during negotiation and prior to execution o f the JOA.

5 We should note Here that preparing and furnishing AFE’s may be customary, but is not required under the

operating agreement. Article VI.B. 1 only requires that the proposal specify “the estimated cost o f the operation.”
Therefore, a drilling proposal specifying the location o f the well, the target zone and the anticipated depth, together
with a lump sum estimate o f the total completed cost would be sufficient.
The only provision which actually requires that an AFE be furnished is contained in Article VI.D Other
Operations, and states that, “If Operator prepares an AFE for its own use, Operator shall furnish any Non-Operator
so requesting an information copy thereof for any single project costing in excess o f _________Dollars ( $ _ _ _ ) . ”
Thus, the requirement for furnishing an AFE even under this provision is responsive in nature, is limited to
information purposes only, and the failure to comply with this provision clearly does not adversely impact a notice
o f operations which otherwise complies with the requirements o f Article VI.B. 1.
Mid: 001010\000999\504020.1
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No mechanism in the model form operating agreement places a ceiling on the obligation
to pay well costs once a party has elected to participate in the operation. Unless all of the
participating parties agree to terminate an operation early, each party must pay its full share of
the expenses incurred. This obligation is essential to the joint undertaking for several reasons.
In the first instance, unless all participating parties are contractually bound to pay for their share
of operations, no party could afford to serve as the operator. Second, unanticipated operational
problems not caused by operator error, incompetence or waste, and which result in added
expense, are risks inherent to the oil and gas industry. Nevertheless, many disputes arise out of
costs that exceed either the original notice (AFE) or anticipated ongoing expenses.
To protect themselves from operator error, incompetence and waste resulting in
significant additional expense, non-operators have only two avenues for legal relief. At the
beginning of the venture, the parties can negotiate an additional provision to the operating
agreement limiting their obligation to pay excessive expenditures to either a fixed sum or a
percentage of the original AFE amount. Such a provision places all of the risk for added
expenses on the operator and necessarily encourages the operator to build contingencies into the
cost estimate.6
To be even-handed, if a cost limitation provision is included, the operator should have the
ability to either terminate the operation or require the parties to re-elect with respect to continued
participation when the threshold has been reached. The 1989 Model Form JOA contains a
provision partially addressing this situation. Article VI.F allows consenting parties owning an
agreed upon-percentage to terminate any operation. However, no provision specifically either
(a) allows the consenting parties to re-elect, or (b) allows the operator, who is often in the
position of advancing the cost of the project, to unilaterally terminate operations.7
6 Following is an example of a cost-overrun limitation provision:
In the event that the accumulated cost o f any operation proposed under Article VI.B.l or VI.C exceeds
125% o f the estimated cost, Non-operators shall have no liability for payment o f the excess costs, except
such excess costs as may result directly from explosion, fire, flood or other sudden emergency, whether of
the same or different nature, and Operator acts to take steps required to deal with the emergency to
safeguard life and property.

The exception to non-liability for excess costs contained in this paragraph tracks the language of
Article VI.D. The risks identified in this exception are inherent in all operations and should be
shared by all parties. Additionally, insurance should be available to ameliorate all or part of the
additional expense. Absent such an exception, the operator would become the de facto insuror of
every operation.
Following is suggested language which can be added to the cost-overrun limitation language
above:
If the accumulated cost o f such an operation proposed under Article VI.B. 1 or VI.C exceeds 125% of the
estimated cost, Operator at its sole election may either (a) terminate the operation and all of the consenting
parties shall be liable for and shall pay for the reasonably necessary costs incurred with such termination,
including without limitation the cost o f plugging and abandonment o f the well in it’s then present state, or
(b) shall require Non-operators to make an election to either continue with the operation or to become a
Non-consenting Party pursuant to the provisions o f Article VI.B.2 with respect to the remainder o f the
3
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The second avenue for relief from cost-overruns is to bring suit against the operator on
the basis that it has failed to perform as a reasonable prudent operator, in a good and
workmanlike manner, in accordance with good oilfield practice. However, because costoverruns and excessive operating expenses generally result from operations conducted on the
Contract Area, a non-operator will be required to show that the operator acted with gross
negligence or willful misconduct in order to establish operator liability for added costs.8
Because the level of proof required for success of such a claim is in most extremely high, the
likelihood of success is virtually none. Alternatively, substantial or repeated cost overruns in
operations may establish a basis for operator removal, which will be discussed in more detail
below.9
B. TIMING
Before commencing any operation within the scope of Articles VLB and VI.C, notice of
the proposed operation must be given to all of the parties having the right to participate.
Following such notice, the non-proposing parties have a period of time, usually thirty (30) days,
in which to respond. In this context, notice acts as a “trigger”, following which the rights of the
parties are determined. Those parties responding to the notice in the affirmative become
obligated to pay for their proportionate share of all costs and expenses. Those parties who fail to
respond or who affirmatively elect not to participate are deemed non-consenting parties and
relinquish their interests in the operation until the recovery of the non-consent penalty provided
for in Article VII.B.2(b).10
However, whether the notice must be properly given according to the terms of the
operating agreement and the response period must be allowed to run as a condition precedent to
invoking the non-consent penalty was the central issue in the recent decision in Dorsett v.
Valence.11 In this case, Valence owned 94% of the working interest and was the operator.
Dorsett was a non-operator and owned only 4% of the working interest. Valence began
constructing roads and drill sites, and as to some wells, set conductor pipe and was actually
operation. In the event that the Operator determines to terminate the operation and to plug and abandon the
well pursuant to this paragraph, such abandonment shall be governed by the provisions o f Article VI.E.
8 I.P. Petr. Co. v. Wevanco Energy, 116 S.W.3d 888 (Tex. App.— Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.), discussing
operator liability for the conduct o f operations on the contract area, and stating the elements for proof o f gross
negligence and willful misconduct.
9 See, Fasken Land & Min. Ltd. V. Occidental Permian Ltd., ___ S.W .3d____, 2005 W.L. 1539260 (Tex. App.— El
Paso) (not released for publication).
10 Non-consent penalties are intended to compensate the consenting parties for assuming the risk o f a particular
operation and are generally calculated as a multiple o f the cost for that risk. Typical non-consent penalties range
from 300% to 500% for drilling and completion expenses, but are often limited to 100% o f the cost o f tangible
surface equipment. Non-consent penalties are sometimes attacked on the basis that they constitute unenforceable
liquidated damages clauses, but the courts are fairly uniform in allowing such penalties as reasonable compensation
for risk. See, Dorsett v. Valance, III S.W.3d 224 (Tex. App.— Texarkana 2003). Recovery o f the non-consent
penalty is limited to the proceeds o f production from successful operations.1
11 Dorsett v. Valance, 111 S.W.3d 224 (Tex. App.— Texarkana 2003)(Reversed 164 S.W.3d 656 (Tex. 2005)),
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drilling beneath the surface before giving notice to Dorsett of proposed drilling operations.
Valence notified Dorsett of the operations, Dorsett failed to respond within the thirty day notice
period and was deemed non-consent and subject to substantial penalties.12 The Texarkana Court
of Appeals characterized this notice as a condition precedent to invoking non-consent penalties.13
Under its ruling, failure to give notice in advance of the operation or commencing an otherwise
properly proposed operation prior to expiration of the contractual notice period relieves the nonconsenting parties of liability for penalties.14 This rationale results in a significant alteration of
the operator/non-operator relationship. Without the imposition of non-consent penalties as
provided for in Article VII.B of the JOA, the relationship between operator and non-operator is
one of cotenants. As cotenants, the operator may recover from the nonparticipating party only
the reasonable cost of the operation.15
The Texas Supreme Court reversed the Texarkana Court of Appeals and rendered
judgment in favor of Valence.16 The supreme court implicitly approved the principle that notice
of the proposed operation is a condition precedent to assessment of non-consent penalties.
However, “Nothing in the Agreement forbids the operator from commencing work before the
end of the notice period.”17 The effect of the time limits contained in the provision preserves the
working interest owner’s right to a specified time period (usually 30 days) before making a
decision and requires the operator to commence work not later than ninety days after the
proposal. The risk of early commencement falls entirely on the operator.18 Regardless of the
time operations are actually commenced, failure of the non-proposing party to consent within the
prescribed time results in application of the non-consent penalty. Thus, in this context, notice of
a proposed operation serves as a condition precedent to begin the response period but is not a
limitation on commencement of operations.
C.

TYPE OF OPERATION

In addition to the timing of notice with respect to the conduct of operations, the notice
must relate to the operation actually conducted. In Stable Energy, LP. v. Kachina Oil & Gas,
12 Id. at 231.
13 Id. at 234.
14 Id. at 234.
15 Id. The analysis in this opinion clearly implicates a cotenancy relationship between the parties to an operating
agreement in the absence o f non-consent penalties. Because the drilling operations in the Dorsett case were
successful, the court does not discuss this relationship at such length as to indicate that recovery is limited only to
production obtained from successful operations. However, under either the cotenancy analysis or application o f the
operating agreement provisions, only successful operations should result in reimbursement o f expenses to the
participating parties.
16 Valence Open Co. v. Dorsett, 164 S.W.3d 656 (Tex. 2005).
17 Id., 164 S.W.3d at 662-63.
18 Id , 164 S.W .3d a t 663.

Mid: 001010\000999\504020.1

5

Inc.19, the operator proposed a reworking operation in an effort to save a lease that was about to
terminate for failure to produce in paying quantities. The proposal by Kachina, the operator, was
to clean out and treat the existing zone in an effort to reestablish production. Twenty eight
percent (28%) of the working interest elected not to participate in the operation. Stable
consented to participate in the operation and agreed to assume the non-consent interest.
However, after notice was given and the response time had lapsed, and before Kachina
commenced operations, Stable and a subsidiary voted their interests plus the non-consent
interests in an attempt to remove Kachina as operator. Following this vote, Stable’s subsidiary
took over possession of the property and conducted a successful deepening operation.20
However, the operation conducted was not the same as the operation contained in the
notice by Kachina, which had been rejected by the 28% non-consenting interest owners.
Completion of the well in a new formation was not substantially the same as the reworking
operation contained in the original notice. The Austin Court of Appeals held that before nonconsent penalties may be invoked, the operation conducted must be substantially the same as the
operation contained in the notice and rejected by the non-consenting parties.212
D.

PROPER PARTIES & MAINTENANCE OF UNIFORM INTEREST

In the recent case of ExxonMobil Corp. v. Valence Oper. Co 22, the court assessed
damages for breach of the JOA Maintenance of Interest provision predicated principally on
ExxonMobil’s failure to give Valence notice of proposed drilling operations. ExxonMobil was
the operator of a three well gas unit subject to a JOA containing a Maintenance of Interest
provision. Although the provision was slightly modified from that contained in the printed form,
the substantive portion was essentially unaffected.23** ExxonMobil farmed out its interest to
Wagner & Brown who then proposed two wells to Valence. Both of the wells were proposed to
19 Stable Energy, L.P. v. Kachina Oil & Gas, Inc., 52 S.W.3d 327 (Tex. App.— Austin 2001, no pet.)
20 Id. at 329-30.
21 Id. An additional aspect o f this case is that the vote to remove Kachina as operator was ineffective. This court
found that under the terms o f the JOA, commencement o f the non-consent operations was a condition precedent to
relinquishment o f the 28% non-consent interest. Because the operation contained in the original notice was never
commenced, the non-consent interests were not effectively relinquished and Stable’s subsidiary company was not
elected operator.
Because the operation was not conducted by the operator and was not otherwise allowed under the
operating agreement, Stable was denied reimbursement for its costs in conducting the operation. This result seems
inconsistent with a cotenancy analysis, and one must assume that the parties failed to plead and prove either
cotenancy or quantum meruit.

22 ExxonMobil Corp. v. Valence Oper. Co., 173 S.W.3d 303 (Tex. App.— Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, application for

pet. pending).

23 ExxonMobil Corp. v. Valence Oper. Co., 173 S.W.3d 303 (Tex. App.— Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, application for
petition pending). The exact language o f the provision follows: “Notwithstanding any other provisions to the
contrary, no party shall sell encumber, transfer or make other disposition o f its interest in the leases embraced within
the Contract Area and in the wells, equipment and production unless such disposition covers either:
1. the entire interest o f the party in all leases and equipment and production; or
2. an equal undivided interest in all leases and equipment and production in the Contract Area.”
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maintenance of uniform interest provision is to make certain that the interests of the parties
remain consistent throughout the life of the lease. By farming out to Wagner & Brown, Exxon
effectively realigned the interests of the parties without consent. Valence had an interest in
continuing production from the Cotton Valley Lime and then using the existing wellbores to
recover the behind-the-pipe reserves in the shallower formations. Wagner & Brown’s sole
interest was to maximize production from the shallower Cotton Valley Sand formation. By
farming out its interest in the shallower formations, Exxon severed its interest from Valence’s,
caused Valence to incur extra costs associated with developing the shallow formations to recover
reserves that could have been recovered through existing wells and thereby breached the JOA.27
III. OPERATOR REMOVAL
A.

THE STANDARD

Operator removal probably results in more litigation, or threatened litigation, than any
other facet of the operating relationship. However, there are very few reported cases dealing
with removal. The removal provision of the 1989 model form was modified from the
predecessor 1982 form. The language of the 1982 form is as follows:
Art. V.B. "... Operator may be removed if it fails or refuses to carry out its duties
hereunder, or becomes insolvent, bankrupt or is placed in receivership, by the affirmative
vote of two (2) or more Non-Operators owning a majority interest based on ownership as
shown in Exhibit “A” remaining after excluding the voting interest of Operator.”
Under this provision, the operator may be removed only in two instances: (a) failure or refusal to
carry out its duties, or (b) insolvency, bankruptcy or receivership.28 ArticleV.A, Designation and
Responsibilities of the Operator, states only that the operator “shall conduct and direct and have
full control of all operations on the contract area” and that “[i]t shall conduct all such operations
in a good and workmanlike manner.”
Aside from having the duty to conduct and direct operations on the contract area, the operator
has very few express duties under the operating agreement.
Article V.B of the 1989 model form operating agreement has been expanded from its
earlier counterpart to provide”
“ ... Operator may be removed only for good cause by the affirmative vote of NonOperators owning a majority interest based on ownership as shown on Exhibit “A”
remaining after excluding the voting interest of Operator; ... For purposes hereof, ‘good
27 Id. In addition, although not addressed, substitution o f ExxonMobil’s farmee as operator o f the farmout wells is
arguably not sanctioned by the terms o f the JOA.
28

A discussion o f bankruptcy laws and application o f the automatic stay to the operating agreement is covered in
other writings and, therefore, outside the scope o f this paper. Happily, this writer will confine our inquiry to an
examination o f the operator’s failure or refusal to carry out its duties under the operating agreement.
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cause’ shall mean not only gross negligence or willful misconduct but also the material
breach of or inability to meet the standards of operation contained in Article V.A. or
material failure or inability to perform its obligations under this agreement.”
Unlike its predecessor, the 1989 form provides that the operator may be removed only for good
cause. Good cause includes only (a) gross negligence or willful misconduct, and (b) a material
breach or inability to perform its obligations. Article V.A. of the 1989 form, sets out the
standard of the operator’s performance and provides that “Operator shall conduct its activities
under this agreement as a reasonable prudent operator, in a good and workmanlike manner, with
due diligence and dispatch, in accordance with good oilfield practice, and in compliance with
applicable law and regulation,,..
Unlike later forms, the 1956 model form operating agreement contains no provision for
removing the operator. Although that form was originally issued nearly fifty years ago, many
properties continue to be operated subject to its terms. Operator removal under this early form
must be accomplished through voluntary means, although it seems that in an extreme case other
relief should be available. We are unaware of a reported case involving the 1956 model form in
which a removal was attempted. Perhaps the lack of case law confirms the operator’s position
under this form.
B.

OPERATOR’S DUTIES & OBLIGATIONS

All of the issues raised by these provisions can be summed up in two rather succinct
questions: (1) What are the duties or obligations of the operator, and (2) who gets to decide if
the operator has “failed or refused” to carry out its duties and, in the case of the 1989 form,
whether such failure or refusal is material?
Determining the express duties or obligations of the operator requires an examination of
the entire operating agreement. Aside from directing operations, the operator is expressly
charged with paying expenses as they come due and maintaining related accounting records,
filing regulatory reports, forwarding notice of non-operator proposed operations, maintaining gas
balancing accounts, settling claims within its delegated dollar authority, and providing the
insurance required by Exhibit “D”. No other activities under the JOA are delegated exclusively
to the operator. Of the operator’s express duties, all except the control and direction of
operations are essentially clerical in nature and require no exercise of discretion.
Under the 1982 form, the complete failure of the operator to provide the noted accounting
and clerical services should serve as grounds for removal. Under the 1989 form, such failure
must be material and the operator is allowed notice and an opportunity to cure its malfeasance
before removal might be accomplished.29 Although the 1989 form is more detailed than the
1982 form in its description of the standard to which the operator is held, as to control and
29 Article V.B. 1. “ . . . such vote shall not be deemed effective until a written notice has been delivered to Operator
by a Non-Operator detailing the alleged default and Operator has failed to cure the default within thirty (30) days
from its receipt o f the notice or, if the default concerns an operation then being conducted, within forty-eight (48)
hours o f its receipt o f the notice.”
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direction of operations both describe a simple negligence standard: good and workmanlike.
However, the 1989 form injects additional elements of materiality, notice and opportunity for
cure. Neither of the provisions address the essential question of who gets to decide whether the
operator has failed or refused to carry out its duties and whether its malfeasance was material.
C.

WHO DECIDES?

This issue was essential to the El Paso Court of Appeals’ decision in Tri-Star Petr. Co. v.
Tipperary Corp.30 The Tipperary case involved a 1982 form of agreement. Tri-Star was the
original operator and Tipperary was a non-operator. Tipperary’s complaint included allegations
that Tri-Star had failed to conduct operations in a good and workmanlike manner and had failed
and refused to carry out its duties under the JOA.3031 The non-operators alleged and there was
some evidence that Tri-Star had improperly charged the joint account, improperly commingled
funds, failed to provide proper billing adjustments, overcharged the non-operators, failed to
provide reasonable information requested by the non-operators, failed to sustain required
volumes o f gas, and allowed acreage to prematurely expire.32 Of these allegations, all except the
loss of acreage and failure to meet production requirements fall within the operator’s accounting
and clerical duties. Tipperary and other non-operators conducted a vote to remove Tri-Star as
operator and substitute Tipperary. Tri-Star refused to step down and turn operations over to
Tipperary as successor operator, claiming that a judicial determination was a condition precedent
to a vote to remove an operator by the non-operators.33
The trial court found that “the non-operators voting to remove Tri-Star as operator made
the determination under Article V.B [of the JOA] that Tri-Star had failed and refused to carry out
its duties under the JOA; and ... upon the effective date of the removal vote, Tipperary became
the duly elected successor operator ....”3435* Thus, the trial court disagreed with Tri-Star’s
argument that a judicial determination of the operator’s “failure or refusal” was a condition
precedent to removal and allowed the non-operators to determine whether or not the operator met
the standards of the JOA. Initially, the non-operators get to decide whether the operator has
failed or refused to perform according to the required standard and presumptively, whether such
failure was material.
The court of appeals found that Tipperary had a reasonable basis upon which to make its
determination and upheld the trial court ruling. This case is hugely important to non-operators.
30 Tri-Star Petr. Corp. v. Tipperary Corp., 103 S.W.3d 583 (Tex. App.— El Paso 2003, pet. denied).
31 Id. at 590.
32 Id. at 590.
33 Id. at 595.
34 Id. at 595.
35 Id at 598,603-04. (ruling that Tipperary presented sufficient evidence that it has a probable right o f recovery,
upholding the trial court’s finding o f a threat o f irreparable injury, and affirming the trial court’s issuance o f a
temporary injunction preventing Tri-Star from interfering with Tipperary’s assumption o f operations).
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If the non-operators can make the initial determination as to the operator’s failure or refusal to
perform its duties and its failure or inability to comply with the standards of the JOA, and there
is a reasonable basis for such determination, a removal vote by the non-operators is enforceable
through temporary injunction. Although Tipperary involved 1982 removal language, the
analysis under the 1989 model form has been found to be similar. This decision has the potential
to move non-operators from the disenfranchised to the empowered. Of course, removal of the
operator on this basis may still be challenged at the trial on the merits to establish a permanent
injunction.36
The rationale of the Tipperary Court was confirmed in the January 2006 decision by the
Austin Court of Appeals in R & R Resources Corp. v. Echelon Oil & Gas, LL C 37 This recent
case involved operator removal under a 1989 form of JOA. The principal complaint by the nonoperators related to accounting procedures and excess operating expenditures. The nonoperators voted to remove R&R as operator for “good cause” and demanded that it relinquish
operations in favor of Leexus Oil & Gas as the duly elected successor operator. R&R refused to
relinquish operations and the non-operators obtained a temporary injunction. The trial court
found that (1) the non-operators had affirmatively voted to remove R&R as operator, (2) R&R’s
improper accounting procedures and operating practices constituted a material breach of the
standards of operation and a failure or inability to perform its obligations under the JOA, thereby
constituting “good cause”, and (3) refusal to relinquish operator status was a breach of the
JOA.38 On appeal, the Austin Court of Appeals confirmed the trial court finding that “Failure to
make prompt adjustments to an operating account and improperly assessed charges—similar to
the allegations in this case—have been bases for finding that an operator ‘failed or refused to
carry out its duties,’ which would support the entry of a temporary injunction.”39 On the strength
of the decisions in Tipperary and R&R Resources, it seems that the non-operators are authorized
to decide the basic removal issues and, if such decision reasonably complies with the plain
language of the governing JOA, the non-operators will be entitled to enforce that decision
through injunctive relief.
D.

DOES GROSS NEGLIGENCE OR WILLFUL MISCONDUCT APPLY TO
REMOVAL?

In the Tipperary case, Tri-Star argued that removal of the operator requires application of
the gross negligence and willful misconduct standard.40 This is another area where lore and law
diverge. Common perception among industry participants is that the exculpatory clause relates
36 Id. at 605. “A ruling on temporary injunctive relief may not be used to obtain an advance ruling on the merits.”
( citing , Iranian Muslim Org. v. City o f San Antonio, 615 S.W.2d 2 0 2 ,2 0 8 ,2 4 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 399 (Tex. 1981)).
37 2006 WL 66458 (Tex. App.— Austin Jan. 10,2006, no pet. hist.) (Memorandum Opinion not reported in
S.W.3d).
38 Id.
39 Id., (citing the Tipperary decision).
40 Tri-Star v. Tipperary, 101 S.W.3d at 596.
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to removal. In both the 1982 and 1989 model forms, the exculpatory clause appears in Article
V.A Designation and Responsibilities of Operator. The language contained in each version is
practically identical:
but in no event shall [Operator] have any liability as Operator to the
other parties for losses sustained or liabilities incurred except such as may result from gross
negligence or willful misconduct.”41 Nothing contained in the plain language of this clause
relates to removal of the operator. The only matter addressed by the exculpatory clause is the
lack of responsibility by the operator to the non-operators for losses and liabilities. These
matters are financial in nature and have little or nothing to do, at least directly, with the
operator’s performance of its duties. Although the court o f appeals did not discuss whether the
gross negligence or willful misconduct standard applies, its support of Tipperary’s temporary
injunction on other bases substantiates the principle that establishing gross negligence or willful
misconduct is not a predicate to operator removal.42 Had either the trial or appellate courts
applied the gross negligence or willful misconduct standard, it is probable that Tri-Star would
have survived.
However, in the R&R Resources decision, R&R specifically argued that the exculpatory
clause prevented the non-operators from removing R&R as operator.43 In this connection, the
appellate court stated that R&R was without “any authority supporting application of an
exculpatory clause that concerns the manner in which an operator conducts drilling operations ...
to equitable claims that do not involve R & R Resources’ ‘liability’ for damages, or to claims for
damages that are not based on drilling operations.”44 Thus, it seems that there is little, if any,
support for application of the exculpatory clause to removal issues in general, particularly where
there is no claim concerning operations conducted on the contract area.
E.

VOTING

The 1982 and 1989 model forms agree that the vote to remove an operator shall be
conducted by the non-operators owning a majority interest based on ownership as shown on
Exhibit “A” to the JO A. Both versions similarly provide that the successor operator shall be
selected by the vote of two or more parties owning a majority interest based upon the ownership
shown on Exhibit “A” to the JOA.
Further, the model forms are consistent that an operator
who is the subject of an involuntary removal may not vote for itself as successor operator.46 The
plain language indicates that all parties are entitled vote except that a removed operator is only
41 Article V.A., A. A.P.L. Form 610— Model Form Operating Agreement - 1989.
42 Tri-Star v. Tipperary, 101 S.W.3d at 597-98. “The trial court in a temporary injunction hearing is only required
to find that Tipperary and Interveners have a probable right o f recovery with respect to their claim o f noncompliance with the removal vote ....”
43 R & R Resources Corp. v. Echelon Oil & Gas, LLC., 2006 WL 66458 (Tex. App.— Austin Jan. 10, 2006, no pet.
hist.) (Memorandum Opinion not reported in S.W.3d).
44 Id. (citing Abraxas Petr. Corp. v. Hornburg, 20 S.W.3d 147, 155 (Tex. App.— Eastland 2001, pet. denied).
45

Tri-Star v. Tipperary, 101 S.W.3d at 597-98.

46 Article V.B.2, A.A.P.L. Form 610— Model Form Operating Agreement - 1989 and 1982 versions.
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allowed to vote for or against any other party. In Fasken Land and Minerals, Ltd. v. Occidental
Permian Ltd., a case involving a unit operating agreement similar in form to the API model
form, the removed operator’s vote against the nominated successor was effective to prevent any
party from being elected to succeed Occidental Permian as unit operator.47
Neither form o f operating agreement contains a provision directly stating whether a nonconsenting party is or is not entitled to vote for a successor operator. Many industry participants
believe that a non-consenting party relinquishes its right to vote on most operating agreement
issues.48 However, whether parties who have relinquished their interest pursuant to the nonconsent provision of the JOA are entitled to vote is likely one more area where lore and law do
not coincide.
Article VI.B.2.b of the 1989 form states that a non-consenting party shall be deemed to
have relinquished its interest “in the well and share of production therefrom.” Likewise, the
consenting parties shall be entitled to receive only the interest relinquished. The obvious result
of this language is that the effect of the non-consent election is limited to a specific well, or even
a particular operation. Thus, a party can participate in one well, elect non-consent status in
drilling the next, and participate in the drilling and completion but not the re-work of a third.49
At the end of the day, the division of interest may vary significantly from well to well and will
change as payout occurs and the non-consenting parties regain possession of the relinquished
interests. In such an event, must the parties vote on the successor operator well-by-well, with
potentially conflicting results, or are votes to be calculated on a weighted average basis?50
The voting provision of the JOA simply states that the parties’ votes are to be weighed
according to the ownership displayed on Exhibit “A”. We are not instructed to consider any
variation in interests from well to well, nor are we asked to determine voting percentages after

47 ___ S.W .3d____, 2005 WL 1539260 (Tex. App.— El Paso 2005, no pet. hist.); See also, Journey Oper., LLC v.
Pogo Prod. Co., 2004 WL 258122 (Tex. App.— El Paso 2004) (Memorandum Opinion).
48 See, e.g., Stable Energy, L.P. v. Kachina Oil & Gas, Inc., 52 S.W.3d 327 (Tex. App.— Austin 2001, no pet.).
This case illustrates the general feeling in the industry that a party who assumes a non-consenting interest owner’s
responsibility for costs is entitled to vote those interests in an operator removal and selection case. Stable had
agreed to participate and to assume the costs attributable to an aggregate 28% non-consent interest. Because the
non-consent operation was never commenced, the interests were not relinquished and Stable was not entitled to vote
the non-consent interests. The court does not address whether Stable would have been entitled to vote the nonconsent interests had they been relinquished.
49 For a good illustration o f this point, see Article VII.B.4 Deepening, which provides that, where less than all of
the parties have participated in drilling, sidetracking or deepening a particular well, the non-consent provisions apply
only to the lesser o f the total depth drilled or the objective zone identified in the notice o f proposed operation and the
well shall not be deepened beyond the initial objective without first affording the non-consent parties an opportunity
to participate in the deepening operation.
50 See, Journey Oper., LLC v. Pogo Prod. Co., 2004 WL 258122 (Tex. App.— El Paso 2004) (Memorandum
Opinion). In this case, the successor operator attempted to utilize a weighted average approach. Even with this
approach, Journey did not receive a majority in interest and it was unnecessary for the court to address the
appropriateness Journey’s method.
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taking into account whether a party is non-consent in a single operation or all of the wells.51 The
operator is placed in control of the contract area, not just a single well. Even where the contract
area is limited to a single spacing unit, unless it is also limited to a single formation, having
control of the contract area can result in responsibility for one or more wells which may be
completed at more than one depth. All Parties have a continuing interest in selecting the
operator. Thus, allocating voting percentages based upon the interests shown in Exhibit “A”,
without regard to non-consent issues, makes basic good sense, simplifies the procedure and
protects the interests of all parties.
IV.

CONCLUSION

In the preceding pages, we have discussed various facets of the operating agreement and
examined a number of recent cases related to those particular issues. Some of those cases are not
completely resolved as they are pending final decision before the next higher court. Regardless
of the outcome of any individual case, one thing is certain, with the increase in recent oil and gas
industry activity and record-high commodity prices, the stakes are sufficiently high that we will
see many new decisions involving the JOA in months to come.52

51 Actually, a party should not be non-consent in all wells unless either the JOA provides for a casing point election
or a subsequent operation has been proposed in the Initial Well. There is no non-consent provision with respect to
drilling the initial well.
52 All are rights reserved to the author. Reproduction with attribution permitted. No claim is made to original
government works.
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EXPENSE ESTIMATES




The Operating Agreement is primarily a
financial instrument.
Disagreements relating to cost & expenses lead
to many (if not most) JOA disputes.


Reported cases often address cost disputes as
damages issues

EXPENSE ESTIMATES


Three provisions point to responsibility for well
costs:
Art. III.B.
 Art. VI.A.
 Art. VI.C.1.


EXPENSE ESTIMATES


The essence of the JOA is contained in Article
III.B.


“… all costs and liabilities incurred in operations
under this agreement shall be borne and paid … by
the parties as their interests are set forth on Exhibit
‘A’.”

EXPENSE ESTIMATES


Art. VI.A. “The drilling of the Initial Well and
the participation therein by all parties is
obligatory …”
This is the project that got everyone interested in the
first place.
 We knew what the costs would be before we signed
up.


EXPENSE ESTIMATES


Art.VI.C.1. “Consent to the drilling, Deepening
or Sidetracking shall include:




Option No. 1: All necessary expenditures for
drilling, … testing, … Completing & equipping
Option No. 2: All necessary expenditures for
drilling, … and testing. [casing point election]

EXPENSE ESTIMATES




Each participant has clearly consented to pay for
its share of expenses.
SO, WHAT’S THE PROBLEM?

EXPENSE ESTIMATES



The dispute arises when actual expenses exceed
expectations.

EXPENSE ESTIMATES
“LORE v. LAW”


Lore:




The AFE limits the amount an operator can
spend on an operation.

Law:


Agreement to pay all necessary expenses related to an
operation.

EXPENSE ESTIMATES


AFE
Estimate of Anticipated Expenses
 Planning tool




No mechanisim in Model Form to limit well
costs unless:
All parties agree to terminate the operation.
 1989 Art. VI.F. agreed upon % can terminate.


EXPENSE ESTIMATES



What can non-operators do?
Sue the Operator for failure to perform its
duties.




Operations on the Contract Area = Exculpatory clause
protection.

Drafting Solutions


Limitation on costs exceeding AFE.
No non-operator liability for excess costs.
 Places all risk for overrun on Operator.


EXPENSE ESTIMATES



What can Operators do?
Drafting Solutions


Sole authority to terminate the operation.




All participants remain liable for termination cost.

Require parties to re-elect consent/non-consent
status.


Distributes risk of cost overrun to all the parties.

FAILURE TO PAY COSTS





The converse of cost-overruns.
Affects primarily the operator.
Operator becomes an involuntary lender.
Non-operator has consented to the operation,
therefore non-consent penalties do not apply.

FAILURE TO PAY COSTS


Limited Remedies for Operator
Charge interest.
 “Net-check” expenses – sufficient revenue stream
 Sue to collect unpaid JIB’s – counterclaim
 1982 Model Form: Foreclose Operator’s Lien.
 Advance payment (preventive solution).


FAILURE TO PAY COSTS



Limited Remedies for Operator
1989 Model Form
Deemed non-consent.
 Suspension of rights.


Withhold information.
 Participation in new operations


NOTICE
BASIC ELEMENTS
Notice is a “Trigger” that affects the rights of the parties.
 TIMING
 TYPE OF OPERATION
 PROPER PARTIES

NOTICE


TIMING
When must notice be given?
Dorsett v. Valence (Ct. Appeals)
Before any operation is commenced.
 Def.: “Commence Operations”
 No commencement before initial response period
expires.
 Condition Precedent to non-consent penalties.


NOTICE
TIMING


When?
Valence v. Dorsett (Supreme Ct.)
Declined comment: “Commence Operations”
 Notice triggers initial response period.
 Condition Precedent to non-consent penalties.
 Not a requirement to commence operations.


NOTICE


TYPE OF OPERATION & EST. COST
Art. VI.B.1 requires notice of the proposed
operation and the estimated cost.
No AFE is required.
 Cost estimate could be as simple as $X in a well
developed area.


NOTICE




TYPE OF OPERATION
Operation proposed must be substantially the
same as the operation conducted.
Condition precedent to non-consent penalties.
Stable Energy, L.P. v Kachina

NOTICE




PROPER PARTIES
Any party to the JOA may propose an
operation.
The proposing party must be a party to the JOA.
ExxonMobil Corp. v Valence Oper. Co.

NOTICE
PROPER PARTIES
ExxonMobil Corp. v Valence Oper. Co.


This case involves both Notice and the Maintenance
of Uniform Interest provision

NOTICE
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Valence Operating Co.


ExxonMobil
owned 82% WI
 Operator of the Gladewater Gas Unit
 Production from the Cotton Valley Lime




Valence


owned 16% WI

NOTICE
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Valence Operating Co.


JOA: slightly modified Maintenance of Interest
provision


No party may sell, encumber, transfer or otherwise
dispose of its interest in the leases or wells unless
such disposition covers either the entire interest in
all leases, equip. & production, or an equal undivided
interest in all leases, equip., & production.

NOTICE
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Valence Operating Co.


ExxonMobil
Farmout to Wagner & Brown
 Cotton Valley Sand test
 Shallower than existing production




Wagner & Brown


2 well proposal to Valence

NOTICE
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Valence Operating Co.


Valence
Ignored well proposals from W&B (stranger)
 Later was informed of the FOA




Wagner & Brown
Deemed Valence non-consent in 1st 2 wells
 Proposed 3 additional wells


NOTICE
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Valence Operating Co.


Valence
Elected to participate in additional wells under
protest
 Sued ExxonMobil on the basis that the FOA
breached the JOA Maintenance of Interest provision


NOTICE
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Valence Operating Co.


Valences’s Position:
Exxon’s FOA violated the MUI provision
 Valence’s failure to timely consent was a result of
Exxon’s breach.
 The shallower formations were accessible from
existing wells
 Damages are equal to the Non-consent penalties,
plus added drilling cost, plus attorneys fees.


NOTICE
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Valence Operating Co.


ExxonMobil’s defense:
Deletion of the word “uniform” allowed partial
transfers.
 The provision only applied to sale of an interest in
both the leases and the wells …
 Exxon did not transfer the wells, therefore no
violation.
 Valence failed to timely respond, their own fault


NOTICE
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Valence Operating Co.


Trial Court:
Judgment for Valence
 $834,299 damages
 $166,250 attorneys fees


NOTICE
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Valence Operating Co.


Court of Appeals
MUI provision clearly prohibits partial transfers
 The Exxon-Wagner & Brown FOA was a breach of
the operating agreement


NOTICE
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Valence Operating Co.
PROPER PARTIES
 No duty to respond to notice from someone not a
party to the agreement.

NOTICE
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Valence Operating Co.


Court of Appeals – Original Opinion


Damages for additional drilling expense vacated.
Valence sought to recover for “lost opportunity”
 No existing or prior proposal to complete shallow zones
 No competing proposals provision in the JOA
 Therefore, loss was speculative


NOTICE
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Valence Operating Co.


Court of Appeals – Substituted Opinion


Damages Awarded for Breach of MOI: incremental
cost of drilling to recover reserves that could be
produced through existing wells

First case directly on this point
 Appeal to Texas Supreme Court pending


OPERATOR REMOVAL




Frequent dispute among operators and nonoperators.
Very few reported cases.

OPERATOR REMOVAL


STANDARD
Defined by the JOA
 No longer owns an interest
 Insolvency
 Gross negligence, willful misconduct
 Fails or refuses to carry out its duties


OPERATOR REMOVAL


Fails or refuses to carry out its duties.
Control and direct operations.
 Pay expenses.
 Regulatory compliance.
 Keep financial and other records.
 1989 JOA requires


materiality
 notice & opportunity for cure


OPERATOR REMOVAL


Who decides?
Tri-Star Petr. Corp. v. Tipperary Corp.
 Non-operators get to decide.
 Reasonable basis for determination.
 Enforceable by temporary injunction.

OPERATOR REMOVAL


Does the exculpatory clause protect the operator
from removal?
No.
 Exculpatory clause relates to liability of the operator,
not removal.


R&R Res. Corp. v. Echelon Oil & Gas LLC

OPERATOR REMOVAL


Voting
Not well addressed by the Model Form.
 Several cases discuss, but none decide issue.
 How are votes calculated when the ownership is
different from well to well?






according to the ownership on Exhibit “A”.

Do non-consenting parties get to vote?


Probably.
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